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The new Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) introduced a highly automated and much 
cheaper systematic observation of personal data. ICTs advance the intensification and the extension of 
surveillance, such that an expanding quantity of data can now be collected, tabulated and cross-
referenced more rapidly and more accurately than old paper files. This process contributes to the 
building a "new electronic cage" constraining the individual, on the basis of his e-profile and data-
matching. Especially two agents of surveillance are interested in collecting and using such data: 
government authorities and private corporations. Massive stores of personal data held on ordinary 
people are now vital to both public services and private business purposes. The new electronic cage is 
more all-encompassing and complete, being able to produce a complete profile of citizens and 
consumers in real time. Both public and private information agencies rely on one another for creating 
and modelling the profiles of good citizens/consumers who, by definition, are well integrated into social 
life, exhibiting predictable behaviour that conforms to the general needs of contemporary consumer/ 
oriented social relations. The underlying assumption under girding the public/private exchange of 
personal data, the idea is that a good consumer is also a good citizen, and vice versa.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This article examine how the surveillance and social 
control is at the same time more and less invasive 
because it is at the same time omnipresent but 
apparently normal. Surveillance has become an integral 
part of everyday life, work and consumption. Surveillance 
runs throughout society in schools, workplaces, 
government, healthcare, and consumerism. As Giddens 
pointed out surveillance is ‘the collection and organization 
of information that can be stored by agencies or 
collectivities and can be used to “monitor” the activities of 
an administered population’ (1987: 174) and one of four 
components of high modernity (Giddens, 1990: 162). The 
growth of surveillance is linked to enhanced possibilities 
for large-scale storage and processing of personal data 
as a result of the “voluntarily” given consumer data, or, as 
Davies noted, an ‘illusion of voluntariness’ (1997: 143), 
carefully constructed by marketers to hide the imposition 
of corporate surveillance. Indeed the personal data are 
systematically and scientifically assessed, marketed, 
permitting the construction of an e-profile more and more 
accurate. 
Especially two actors of  surveillance  are  interested  in  
collecting and using those data and e-profile: government 
authorities (police, secret service, local government etc.) 
on the one hand and private corporations on the other 
hand. The state institutions for better controlling citizens 
prevent and punish crimes and imposing social norms 
and also for the correct functioning of Welfare State and 
corporations for targeting customers with personalized 
advertising. 
The new digitalized surveillance allowed a new form of 
social control that tries to direct and influence the beha-
viour of people. Indeed reconstructing the past and the 
present by using this information the new controller can, 
in some way, address and influence future behaviour. For 
the sake of clarity, since always the governance entails 
control and its aims is to steer and direct individuals, 
encouraging them to embrace particular behaviours. As 
Haggerty suggested ‘while governance inevitably 
involves efforts to persuade, entice, coerce or cajole 
subjects to modify their behaviour in a particular direction 
the targets of governance are understood to be a locus of 
freedom, although this freedom is inevitably bounded by 
various constraints’ (Haggerty, 2006: 40). 
  
 
 
All the forms of punishment were always future-orien-
ted, because they involved forms of specific deterrence 
that sought to stop an individual offender from committing 
comparable acts again in the future, or a form of general 
deterrence that sought to deter others from doing so. 
Thus, in some way, both ‘previous’ and ‘contemporary’ 
forms of social control are future-oriented. They differ in 
the assumption on the strategies and forms of knowledge 
that can be used to govern future behaviour. Above all, 
and this is the main difference today, different agents are 
using different strategies and forms of knowledge to 
govern future behaviour for different reasons and 
purposes. 
The particularity of the society of consumers (Bauman, 
2005) is that private corporations, what here I call the 
economic elite, are trying to steer and direct individuals 
using private surveillance and them media’s empire and 
cultural industry. More strongly: if it is normal and inevit-
able that governance ‘efforts to persuade, entice, coerce 
or cajole subjects to modify their behaviour in a particular 
directions’, it is not normal that to do it is not a democratic 
and public institution but the economic elite: in other 
words, a private organization. Furthermore the market 
and the economic elite try to control directly the 
citizens/consumers, reconstructing the ‘biographies of 
consumption’ through the combination of transactional 
and personal data (Evans, 1998). 
What this article is suggesting is that, the monopoly of 
violence and coercion is still in the State hand, but who is 
persuading and seducing individuals to modify their 
behaviour embracing new values, social norms and 
principles, is the market through the corporations. This 
separation between monopoly of violence or use of 
coercion from one hand and the capacity to steer and to 
seduce individuals on the other hand is one of the 
particularities of the society of consumers. 
The first part of this article will examine the develop-
ment of the Panopticon model as a utopian project 
consisting of controlling spaces through the ‘gaze’. The 
Panopticon is not a deterrent project instead it tries to 
modify the behaviour of the inmates, creating a soul, 
through Foucault calls ‘disciplinary strategies’. The aim of 
seeing if the ‘soul’ and the new ‘disciplinary strategies’ 
created by the panopticon is now referable to the mass 
media and cultural industry and to the marketers 
strategies. 
The second part of the article will explain how the 
famous concept of the iron cage, formulated by Weber, 
should be accompanied and integrated by the new 
electronic cage. Indeed in a Post-panopticon1 society  the  
                                               
1
 I am referring to a Postpanopticon society and not Postmodern society, 
because here, trying to explain the new form of social control, I assume that 
this concept is more precious and permit me to refer to a particular aspect of 
the society: surveillance. Furthermore I want, here, avoid the discussion on the 
problematic concept of Postmodernity/Modernity. However, even if I know the 
passage from an era to another one is not so clear and brutal, I assume that we 
are already entered in a new era. This not means that the Postmodern era is 
absolutely different and some modern’s values and principles are still valid, but 
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new surveillance, is also based on an electronic 
collection of data-imaging, requiring a new cage, no 
longer iron but electronic. 
Both types of surveillance rely on one another for the 
right functioning of a consumer-oriented society: on this 
point is developed the third part of the article. A good 
citizens/consumers are, by definition, well integrated into 
social life, exhibiting predictable behaviour that conforms 
to the general needs of contemporary consumer-oriented 
social relations. The underlying assumption under girding 
the public/private exchange of personal data is the idea is 
that a good consumer is also a good citizen, and vice 
versa. 
 
 
THE PANOPTICON 
 
First, the model of Panopticon is addressed briefly and 
the way it is evolved and argued is obsolete. Many 
scholars address the researches and studies on surveil-
lance, reformulating the concept of Panopticon (Foucault, 
1977) because of the panopticon model is a strong 
framework for discussing surveillance theoretically. Con-
cept as electronic panopticon (Gordon, 1987), omnicon 
(Goombridg, 2003), global panopticon (Gill, 1995), 
panspectron (De Landa, 1991), myoptic panopticon 
(Leman-Langois, 2003), fractal panopticon (De Angelis, 
2001), pedagopticon (Sweeny, 2004), polyopticon (Allen 
1994), panopticon discourse (Berdayes, 2002), social 
panopticism (Wacquant 2001), neo-panopticon (Mann et 
al., 2003) or the synopticon (Mathiesen, 1997), cybernetic 
panopticon (Bousquet, 1998), the superpanopticon 
(Poster, 1990), electronic surveillance (Lyon 1992), the 
panoptic sort (Oscar, 1993), social Taylorism of 
surveillance (Frank and Kevin, 1999) or postpanopticon 
society (Ragnedda, 2008), are a clear evidence of the 
impact of this metaphor on our culture. All this excellent 
theoretical, conceptual and methodological approaches 
are useful and necessary points of departure for any 
studies on surveillance issues. However, to understand 
surveillance-consumer we should move beyond the 
panopticon and at the same times taking some important 
characteristics from it, as the unverifiable/visibility of the 
tower of control, the control of the space through the 
gaze and the tentative to create a docile-body of the 
surveilled. 
The architectural astuteness of the design ensures that 
with the play of light there are no shadowed zones in 
which to hide - all occupants are constantly exposed. 
This utopian plan devised by Bentham consisted of con-
trolling spaces through the ‘gaze’ because, as Foucault 
remind us ‘there is no need for arms, physical violence, 
material  constraints.  Just   a  gaze’   (1980,   155).   The  
                                                                                   
the grand narratives of modernity is passed, as well as well as the lines between 
traditional sociological dichotomies. The new era and the intellectual approach 
postulate new relationship between subject/object, author/text and reject all the 
objectifying methodology.  
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Panopticon model is more than a simple deterrent: its 
objective is to modify the behaviour of the inmates, by 
means of what Foucault calls ‘disciplinary strategies’. 
These ‘disciplinary strategies’ replace the instrument of 
‘physical compulsion’ that was often used. Continuous 
surveillance known to the inmates creates a ‘spirit’ which 
forces them to internalize detailed lists of behavioural 
norms. In some way, the inmates watch themselves, by 
internalizing the gaze of the controller: in others words 
inmates modify themselves by internalizing values and 
model proposed by controllers. 
The guarantee of dominance by the keepers is due to 
their facility of movement, contrary to the ‘inhabitants’ of 
the Panopticon who are confined within cells without any 
possibility of moving. The crucial characteristic of the 
Panopticon is the unverifiable/visibility that the power 
comes to assume. ‘Visible: the inmate will constantly 
have before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower 
from which he is spied upon. Unverifiable: the inmate 
must never know whether he is being looked at any one 
moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so’ 
(Foucault, 1977: 201). 
The insecurity of the inmate comes from his knowledge 
of being controlled without knowing exactly when this is 
happening, and this leads to the individual complying with 
the norms, the rules. It is the randomness of screening 
that creates the self-disciplining docile body. The real or 
fictitious presence of the overseer is almost insignificant, 
since the prisoner does not know whether he is being 
observed at any particular moment. What is important is 
the development of the self-discipline mechanism (but not 
its birth, as some authors suggest. Indeed, historically the 
fear of hell has always operated as a mechanism of 
discipline). The ‘inmates’ state of awareness of continued 
visibility is a guarantee of their submission to power. ‘An 
inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its 
weight will end by internalizing to the point that there is 
his own overseer, each individual thus exercising this 
surveillance over, and against, himself. A superb formula: 
power exercised continuously and for what turns out to 
be a minimal cost’ (Foucault, 1980: 155). Bentham 
emphasised that power has to possess the 
characteristics of visibility and non-verifiability: both of 
this characteristics seems to be reduced in many 
contemporary forms of surveillance. 
In the new scenario offered by ICT, and in particular by 
Internet, this principle comes to have great value and 
importance as the this new medium operates, in some 
way, like a new electronic Panopticon with a central 
(virtual) tower which is, at the same time both visible and 
non-verifiable. Whilst passwords, encryption and plus 
codes enable hidden communication, in actual fact, the 
average internet user is by and large ignorant of their 
existence  and  indeed,  is  ignorant  of  the  fact  that 
information provided from his use of email, for example, 
is being used to construct a profile of him/her. Currently, 
however, increasing numbers of people are learning that  
 
 
 
 
their online and consumer behaviour is being monitored 
by unseen keepers, but without knowing when and 
exactly by whom: the users/consumers just know that 
them behaviour is monitored by the ‘unknown figure of 
power’. Thus, the principle of Panopticon is incorporated 
in a new tools and technology of surveillance. In this way 
it is possible to say that a new form of Panopticon is 
emerging: cyber-Panopticon. Even if the Internet cannot 
be reduced as a technology of surveillance, some prince-
ples of panopticon is still operating in this new medium, 
as the impossibility for the ‘surfers’ to know if they were 
being watched that induced in them a state of conscious 
and permanent visibility that, could, assured the 
‘automatic functioning of power’ (Foucault 1978: 201). 
In this virtual tower, at every moment the operations of 
every single consumer can potentially be observed, 
recorded and reconstructed. Indeed in a virtual world is 
possible to capture, store, and analyze the entire 
information history of users’ activities. This possibility 
makes the ICT superior by comparison to the simpler 
Benthamian project. From the centre the outskirts check 
the suburb, above checks below, and the profile of the 
individual is reconstructed, leaving whole images of every 
individual consumer. We should ask if as well as 
reconstructing, reading and cataloguing present and past 
actions, it can also build, creating inputs for the future, or 
lead and influence the consumer toward norms and 
default values. What this means for observation and 
social control seems to be that in order to prevent deviant 
actions, the power will seek to modify actions before they 
happen using the recorded ‘data-information’. This is the 
aim of the State surveillance. 
This will be achieved, preferably, through persuasion 
and similarly ‘soft’ coercion, in contrast to the panopticon 
model in the prison context. Importantly, the engendered 
social control goes far beyond watching to dictating and 
creating channels where only permitted behaviour flows 
in one direction. It is possible to postulate that new 
surveillance cannot be based only on the process of 
watching (opticon) but also operates in many other 
different ways. 
Furthermore, it is also ‘smart’ and permits distinct 
responses based on feedback. On the other hand, it is 
very complex and there are always counter-trends. 
The objective is to understand if the ‘soul’, which, 
according to Bentham, is created in the prisoners under 
continual observation, is also reproduced in the 
consumers. The differences are manifold: first of all, the 
consumers are free individuals in the sense that they are 
not physically confined as in the prison panopticon; the 
ICT and mass media does not have an unique and 
centralizing tower which holds all the consumers under 
pressure as in the Panopticon model; it is not clear which 
behaviour is imposed and who the overseers are. 
Therefore, one can conceptualize the Panopticon as a 
model that is transposed to the Internet, but I am wary of 
this. Indeed, it is not fruitful to think about  the  Internet  in  
  
 
 
terms of the panopticon. In fact, the types of surveillance 
characteristic of the internet are just so qualitatively 
different that the analogy with the panopticon simply 
breaks down. Furthermore, it will be a mistake to develop 
a model of surveillance that can usefully be generalized 
to all surveillance contexts. This seems be particularly 
true with the ICT. Thus, the panopticon requires the 
integration and improvement of the model. In fact, this 
model has progressively been replaced by a more refined 
technical manipulation of the bodies which is more 
complex and effective in terms of, according to Foucault’s 
conception, producing disciplined subjects. It is also 
through discipline that the model achieves social control 
in democratic societies. The discipline, as Foucault 
intended, is the mechanism by which we may succeed in 
controlling the thinner elements of the social body, in 
capturing the same social atoms that is, the individuals. 
Techniques of individualization of power: like watching 
someone, like controlling conduct, behaviour, attitudes, 
like intensifying its performance, multiplying its abilities, in 
order to position it in the place in which it will be more 
useful (Foucault, 1977). 
Discipline is not synonymous with the Panopticon. 
These two concepts can be easily misinterpreted or 
confused with other analogies, such as the individua-
lization of control and space management. In fact, these 
two concepts point out a crucial difference: the identi-
fication of the controller. The Panopticon model produces 
the illusion in the inmate that the overseer is in some way 
identifiable and that his figure is quite clear despite his 
invisibility. It is not his face which is visible but his figure: 
the figure of the controller. By contrast, in disciplinary 
institutions where neither the face nor the figure of the 
overseer is identifiable, power gets lost in the web of 
hierarchies and shattered in a plurality of strategies that 
go beyond simple surveillance. A society of consumers 
seems to embrace more a disciplinary strategy, more 
than the panopticon strategies. Indeed the Panopticon 
model, as initially conceived, could be considered 
somewhat obsolete now and must be integrated and not 
completed disregarded. 
It has been argued here that the advent of the 
postpanoptic society doesn’t imply that the panopticon 
model and principles are invalid, but that these concepts 
must be revisited and adapted to the new social context, 
shaped by consumerism. 
 
 
THE ELECTRONIC CAGE 
 
Modern States, according to Foucault, present the most 
perfect combination of techniques of individualization and 
procedures of totalitarianism than has ever existed in 
history. They have become more stable thanks to a long 
process of educating and disciplining the population. The 
time in which this process has been completed is what 
we call “Modernity”. After the  sunset  of  (first)  Modernity  
Ragnedda          183 
 
 
 
new forms of discipline and control have followed that 
differ, from earlier times and ways. These new forms 
have also been shaped by the mediation of ICT and are 
much quicker and more immediate. The iron cage is ‘the 
result of the combined tendencies of modern bureau-
cracies and modern individuals’ (Hoogenboom and 
Ossewaarde, 2005: 601) and are ‘the great institutional 
structures of modern society - the bureaucracies of the 
market and state in which we are destined to live but over 
which we, as ordinary citizens, have little control’ (Maley, 
2004: 69). 
At the same time, the iron cage, in the modernity, was 
also a guarantee of keeping society peaceful against 
raging revolutionary upheavals. This became possible 
thanks to the rise of militarization of social institutions and 
enterprises, where the rigidity of duty and workplaces 
was at the same time an element of social integration. 
The culture of new Capitalism, in Sennet’s words, 
loosens these iron cages, destroying with it also the 
consequent and very specific notions of time. It is a struc-
tured, rationalized, expectable time inside which social 
relations are constructed. The price that individuals paid 
for this organized time could be their freedom or their 
originality. The iron cage was at the same time a prison 
and a house (Sennet, 2006). 
Today, this house-cage is accompanied by the new 
cages, much more flexible in time and space, operating in 
the virtual world and in the electronic bureaucracy. ICT 
are a fundamental infrastructures for the State and the 
Corporation and by both could be used for surveillance 
the citizens/consumers, that more and more tend to use 
ICT, not only as essentials of life, but also as mean for 
expression themselves and their intentions. More and 
more ‘live’ are now moving on the cyberworld and this 
space or world is an important vital space to control the 
population. For the State it is important ‘in order to 
integrate people into national order and national interests 
[…] Management of the population has been extending 
from urban space to cyberspace’ (Ogura 2006: 287). For 
the Corporations the cyberspace is a vital space because 
they can watch, observe and build the profile of each 
user/consumer, using the data that the consumers give 
voluntary. To involve a ‘voluntary’ component has the 
effect of neutralizing public concern rendering privacy into 
a commodity. Thus the ‘traditional rights have been put 
on a commercial footing, thus converting privacy rights 
into consumer issues’ (Davies, 1997: 144). 
The ICT introduced a highly automated and much 
cheaper systematic observation of data about people 
(Clarke, 1988) advancing the intensification and the 
extension of surveillance. Indeed a huge amount of data 
can now be collected, tabulated and cross-referenced far 
faster and more accurately than old paper files, enabling 
previously unimaginable levels. All those data and the 
capacity to aggregation, interconnectivity and real-time 
analysis of a large range of personal information, build a 
‘new electronic  cages’  that  are  more  all-encompassing  
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and complete. The new iron cages are able to produce in 
real time a complete photograph of the consumers/ 
citizens and could be used by corporate surveillance 
agents to transform data into intelligence, where the 
former is a raw resource, and the latter are data 
elaborated and used by the marketers in their labour to 
predict, influence and direct consumer behaviour (Gandy, 
1993). With the forthcoming technologies and them 
marriage with the consumers surveillance it is possible to 
postulate a scenario – as imagined by Philip Dick in The 
Minority Report – in which the consumer behaviour are 
directly and indirectly influenced and manipulated by the 
marketers. The consumer privacy has become a larger 
concern due to the growth of direct and database 
marketing, the Internet and others data capture 
techniques (Horne and Horne, 1997; O’Malley et al., 
1999; Christy and Mitchell, 1999). 
The ‘iron cages’ of which Weber spoke, have today 
been integrated by ‘electronic cages’ as the adminis-
tration of the State, restructured by new technology, 
becomes increasingly facile. The electronic cage is not 
the replacement of the existing modern iron cage, but the 
over-determination of the existing one. 
We can also borrow the metaphor of the cloak by 
Weber in order to cast a glance over the course of our 
increasingly technology-dependent society. For Weber, 
the accumulation of wealth by the Protestants was a 
means to achieve eternal salvation. As he points out in 
‘The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism’, 
success in one’s job was an indicative of being appre-
ciated by God. In other words, the accumulation of wealth, 
at the base of the birth of Capitalism, was a ‘cloak’ that at 
first was used like an instrument to warm people up, 
slowly becoming refined and imprisoning man inside an 
iron cage. In his words ‘In Baxter’s view tile care for 
external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the 
‘saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any 
moment’. But fate decreed that the cloak should become 
an iron cage’ (Weber, 1930 [1904/05]: 181). 
The computerization of bureaucracy - first used as a 
tool and then slowly became an end in itself - which 
allows for a more detailed and greater volume of 
information to be collected on each individual, was 
initially used as a ‘cloak’ in order to ‘warm up’, but it is 
now wrapping up and imprisoning the individual inside an 
electronic cage. The ‘value-rationality’ loses meaning and 
importance leaving space for the ‘goal oriented-
rationality’. The pigeonholing of the individual with 
electronic labels that initially served to slim down and 
expedite bureaucracy are now at an end in themselves: it 
follows that there is a loss of identity, the number or label 
dominates the individual rendering him/her superfluous. 
For Weber, rationalization plays a key role inside 
modernity and expresses itself in all aspects of social life: 
in the economic field with the affirmation of Capitalism; in 
the political field with the preeminence of the rational 
legal power until bureaucracy arrives as the main form of  
 
 
 
 
administration. The central points of our discourses 
according to Weber are that rationalization coincides 
more and more with an invading control of man in the 
natural atmosphere. In a consumer society human 
behaviour becomes more predictable. In other words, the 
process of rationalization typical of modernity, on one 
hand allows an uncontested dominion of man over nature, 
but on the other hand, mobilized standardized criteria 
which render human behaviour more predictable. It is his 
ominous prediction which stems from his pessimistic 
vision of the unstoppable advancement of the bureau-
cratic system, that a day will come when we will find 
ourselves as only small cogs in a gear. His fear was that 
of living in an increasingly specialized society, where the 
work of everyone would be a cog in a gear serving a 
bigger objective. The fear that we can express a century 
later is that we feel ourselves not like cogs in a gear but 
like bits inside a binary system of 0 1 codes of informa-
tion. The risk is one of a dehumanization of individuals, 
submitting to the dominance not of bureaucracy, but of 
numbers and passwords. Indeed we are constantly 
transformed into bits and flows of information, which are 
processed into our multiple data doubles. Then the 
human body is ‘reassembled in different settings through 
a series of data flows. The result is a decorporealized 
body, a ‘data double’ of pure virtuality’ (Haggerty and 
Ericson, 2000: 611). Furthermore, another risk is that 
surveillance also reinforces divisions by sorting people 
into social categories, implementing social divisions and 
social discriminations. 
 
 
DOUBLE SURVEILLANCES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
SURVEILLANCES 
 
One of the key conditions of the contemporary 
surveillance is that it is conducted and directed for a 
different aims and purposes by different agents. Even if 
multiple agents who operate in local and global context 
exist, as both public and private. In this section, I’ll try to 
address the discussion postulating the existence of two 
macro-agent of surveillance: State (public) and Corporate 
(private). 
Let me explain this concept. Each different society has 
its own characteristics for surveillance of the population, 
but now, and this seems to be a particularity of our 
society, there exist two different and parallels ways to 
conduct surveillance of citizens: public-surveillance and 
private-surveillance, or if we prefer, State-surveillance 
and Corporate-surveillance. However, at the same time, it 
is necessary to extract the fundamental common 
characteristics among this two different surveillance way, 
in order to make a theoretical framework for postpanoptic 
society. 
It should be specified that surveillance is neither good 
nor bad. The particular governmental ambitions are a 
consumer-oriented society, based on the ICT as a 
medium of exchange  and  a tool  for  social  control.  The 
  
 
 
role of ICT within infrastructures of surveillance and con-
trol cannot be understated. Not only fidelity card shopping 
or intelligent transportation systems connect purchasing 
patterns to customer databases, but also biometric tech-
nologies and, above all, Internet are used for monitoring 
and collection of personal and identifiable information 
about millions of users/citizens/customers. In an analysis 
of Giddens’s work (1987), Webster (2006) portrays the 
use of surveillance tools to capture transactional 
information, information which ‘contributes towards an 
individuated portrait of that person’s spending habits, 
clothing and food tastes, even preferred shopping 
locations’ (225). 
The new technologies of surveillance may not always 
prevent of the actions but tend to prevent the decisions. 
One can argue that the surveillance systems are ineffec-
tual at preventing violent crimes. This sometimes is true; 
however this does not imply that they are without effects 
on human behaviour. 
Let me now explain some characteristics of the 
postpanoptic society, moving from the assumption of “two 
different agents of surveillance”. What I am suggesting is 
that there exists a separation between the State 
monopoly of violence or use of coercion from one hand 
and the capacity to steer and to seduce individuals on the 
others hands. In others words, the monopoly of violence 
and coercion is still in the State’s hand, but the 
corporations are the agents doing the persuading and 
seducing of individuals to modify their behaviour. Under 
the pressure of neo-liberal globalization, the nation-state, 
once one of the distinguishing feature of modernity, has 
been induced to truncate its supreme political power 
within its national borders. Further, the neoliberal 
ideology has forced the nation-state to retreat from social 
programs in societies. The State, in the last decades, 
grows slim, reducing it to what Bauman calls a ‘local state 
of police’, which assures that minimum order is 
maintained to move transactions forward (Bauman, 1998: 
77). The State is just the guarantor of order and does not 
have to restrain the market or to wield sticks to unbridled 
consumerism. Neo-liberalism dictates the rules of a more 
and more consumerist society that has a need of social 
order in a society in which the ‘consumption has 
increasingly assumed a central systemic role in the 
reproduction of capitalist society’ (Clarke, 2003: 2). 
The mass media, spreading the values of neoliberalism 
in a consumer oriented society, tend to create or cultivate 
a new docile-body that more easily tends to assume the 
values and behaviour promoted by the new economic 
elite. Through mass media the freedom is equated (and 
often reduced) to market choice. Children, before they 
are able to read and write and before possessing a well-
defined sense of self, have already received millions of 
messages from mass media, including images of market 
values, gender stereotypes, reproducing in the new 
consumers-citizen the ‘soul’, which, according to 
Bentham,  is  created  in  the  prisoners  under   continual  
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observation. 
As Monahan argued the ‘surveillance systems operate 
as extensions of the neoliberal state carving out new 
markets for high-tech companies and integrating police 
into the social worlds of public education’ (Monahan, 
2006: 110). And it is from consumption that one of the 
more interesting and effective means of social control 
arises. The ‘device’ of social control is consumption. As 
Lyon, rightly, argues ‘for the majority, though, consump-
tion has become the all-absorbing, morally-guiding, and 
socially-integrating feature of contemporary life in the 
affluent societies. Social order – and thus a soft form of 
social control – is maintained through stimulating and 
channelling consumption, which is where consumer 
surveillance comes in, but this is achieved in the name of 
individuality, wideness of choice and consumer freedom’ 
(Lyon, 1994: 137). 
More reliable and specific profiles of the consumer are 
drawn up to fit the products in more precise ways and to 
push the consumer towards them. It is quite clear that the 
vast majority of the publicity produced for the general 
public does not hit its target. The message does not 
arrive. With a more and more accurate profile, the system 
address the information collected in even more precise 
ways. The data will be for the consumer to supply and 
more consumption companies will discover more infor-
mation about their customers. The more who consume, 
the more vulnerable they become and the easier is to 
conquer them. This kind of information could be used in 
profiling, social sorting and risk assessment (Lyon, 2002). 
Moreover, the collection elaboration of all the data and 
information that we leave behind when we purchase 
products with credit or debit cards and loyalty cards, on 
the basis of which the commercial history of every single 
consumer can be reconstructed. The collected data forms 
several devices of control and surveillance that allow for 
a more faithful reconstruction of the profile of every 
individual. This is true for corporate surveillance as well 
as for State surveillance. Indeed, the State still uses 
some features of the panoptic model to achieve its goal 
to surveillance the citizens and guaranties the orders. 
Indeed, the so-called “War on Terror”, began under the 
Bush administration and extended all over the world, 
used the National Security Agencies, as well others 
Security agencies, as a method of data gathering on all 
US citizens, including monitoring of phone calls, websites 
visit, credit card payments and so on. This State 
surveillance is extended to everyone and not only to ‘the 
suspicious’ and operates in conjunction with 
telecommunications corporations. 
There is a dangerous future maybe of Orwellian 
scenarios of a kind which are pertinent to the social and 
historical contexts in which we live. In an article of 1985, 
Gary T. Marx, introduced a fundamental concept that has 
been resumed and elaborated on since: the society of 
surveillance (1985). He outlined the difference between 
the surveillance  typical  of  Modernity,  and  one  that  he 
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defines as ‘new surveillance’, that is here considered 
typical of Postmodernity. While in modernity surveillance 
was an instrument of rationalization of the bureaucratic 
activity of the State, and served to run a nation, the new 
surveillance emerging tends collects data that do not only 
serve to run the State, it is also increasingly useful to 
large economic institutions, banks, insurance companies, 
for controlling and potentially to manipulating the social 
opinions, preferences and interactions of people. 
For the sake of clarity, some distinctions would be 
made. This study does not want to introduce a false 
dichotomy, in which modern surveillance was used only 
for the bureaucratic activity of the State and in contrast 
the postmodern surveillance is used only for commercial 
reasons. In fact, this ignores that surveillance in moder-
nity was always a tool of commerce (think about double-
entry bookkeeping, surveillance on the factory floor just to 
cite two examples), as well ignore the Postmodern 
surveillance is used, in different way, to help the State to 
run better. In definitive, the new surveillance is used by 
both agents in different way but with the same final aim: 
to control the citizens/consumers. 
The new surveillance is also used by the corporation to 
reinforce the status quo and its privileged position in 
society. As Ogura underlined ‘the fundamental 
characteristics of surveillance are to forecast and remove 
the elements that may constitute barriers to fundamental 
preconditions of the capitalist regime’ (2006: 288). This 
new surveillance and the more and more sophisticated 
technologies are affecting choice, and there is an 
increasing risk of total control (Marx, 1985). 
However, it must be mentioned that we are in front at 
the proliferation of surveillance in different contexts and 
for different purposes, and not only to increase the total 
control. Indeed, surveillance could be seen also in 
enjoyable aspect and not only a fruits of the rational 
project. The SNS, blog or the reality show suggest that 
for some people to be watched is a pleasure, as well to 
be the viewers (not the controller). This implies that more 
and more people are constituted as viewers and viewed 
and the experience to observe each other is common in 
everyday life, creating a peer-to-peer monitoring 
practices ‘characterized as a displacement of “Big 
Brother” by proliferating “little brothers” who engage in 
distributed forms of monitoring and information gathering’ 
(Andrejevic, 2006 :405). 
What here is important is that surveillance has a 
function of rationalization in a regulatory project that 
moves from the panoptic model but must also go beyond. 
Indeed an ulterior differentiation of the Panopticon model 
is emerging that is its meaningful evolution. The inmate of 
the Panopticon was known as being under control, as 
constantly being watched (even if he did not know when). 
He knew well the rules of control. Pain was adapted to 
punishment. Is it possible that citizens are now unaware 
of being under control and neither understands the 
reason for being under control nor the norms which have  
 
 
 
 
been adapted for this purpose. The problem is not the 
lack of knowledge of being under control, but not being 
worried about it. It is at this point that a perceptual and 
cognitive revolution begins that invests the role of 
surveillance. Before it was limited to very identifiable 
persons, it was confined to a determined physical area 
and it was considered an element of repression. Parado-
xically, today, the surveillance can be also considered as 
a twofold guarantee: of social inclusion and freedom. In 
fact, surveillance is ‘a technique of redefinition and 
making clear the boundaries between exclusion and 
inclusion, separation and integration, absence and pre-
sence, disregard and consideration’ (Ogura, 2006: 277). 
Let me briefly explain these two points. Firstly, not to be 
under control means to be marginalized. Indeed there are 
categories that are marginalized and not controlled. The 
monopoly of the ‘legitimate means of movement’ (Torpey, 
2000) is still in the hand of the (modern) State, that can 
use tools such as ID cards to include/exclude citizens 
distinguishing between nationals and foreign citizens. 
Furthermore it can distinguish between regular and 
irregular, including or excluding, separating or integrating. 
An example could be the clandestine individual who is 
outside control and for this reason is excluded. Here, 
often, the two kind of surveillance could be in contrast. 
Indeed the State, inside its national border, must identify, 
through surveillance, all citizens giving them right and 
duty. At the same time the private companies need only 
workers without any kind of social right. Thus, in the 
Western societies, the authorities turn a blind eye (giving 
up at its prerogative to give and identity to everybody) 
toward the millions of illegal workers: invisible for the 
surveillance operated by the State, but under surveillance 
by the private companies, where the use of new 
communication technologies to monitor employee 
behaviour is increased in the last years (Alge, 2001; 
D’Urso, 2006; King, 2003; Lane, 2003). 
So, there is informal recognition of this status, even 
though they are not formally recognized/controlled. 
Moreover they are crucial for the economy, because they 
accept a work’s condition without subsequent rights. 
These include undocumented workers and black market 
workers (e.g., sex trades and drug trades). This category 
of person is on the margins of society and symbolizes 
danger. Ironically in this context, control/surveillance 
becomes the guarantee of inclusion. 
Secondly, in a society where the hyperreality is much 
more important than the reality, it is fundamental, to 
participate in social life and not being marginalized, to live 
in this virtual reality made by the mass media. And it is 
also for this reason than more and more people wish to 
participate in the reality show or having an electronic alter 
ego on the cyberworld. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Social control also means the ability to push individuals to  
  
 
 
adapt themselves to the expectations of the group. The 
mass media has the ability, at various levels, to condition 
and influence the perception of their expectations and, 
consequently, their expectations. Indeed, if an individual 
or customer perceives that its group of reference expects 
from him a determined behaviour he or she will stretch to 
adapt to this in order to avoid the pain of deviance and 
exclusion from the group. It does not matter what the 
group actually expects, but what the individual believes 
that the group expects. It does not count therefore what 
‘reality’ is, but its representation, its simulacrum. The 
mass media seems to move in this field: influencing 
expectations and perceptions and thus acting like a 
formidable instrument of social control. Although mass 
media plays a key role in this, it is not enough to 
guarantee the homogeneity and the coherence in a post-
modern society. Indeed in our society, where all the 
classic institutions that were deputies to ‘social control’ 
are in crisis (family, school, religious institutions and so 
on), it is also a new form of surveillance that is both 
intrusive and invisible, more invasive but perceived as 
normal. The mass media plays a crucial role in creating 
the conditions for surveillance that are perceived as being 
natural and unavoidable in spreading and reinforcing the 
neo-liberal values, influencing the citizen-consumers’ 
behaviour. 
Also the panopticon, as Foucault underlined (1977: 
198), is at the same time a system of light and language. 
In other words the panopticon is a system of optic (gaze) 
surveillance that is not only predicated on the 
documentation and circulation of personal information 
(language), but it is reinforced by that information. Some 
aspects of panoptic diagram of power are still valid but 
need supplementing. In regard to this double aspect of 
panopticon (gaze and language), some clarifications are 
needed: first is to change the gaze to include a bi-
directional and some times peer-to-peer aspect of 
monitoring, that could create what Whitaker (1999) called 
a model of a ‘participatory Panopticon’ in which the 
watched is also doing the watching, because it repre-
sents a form of consensual submission to surveillance. 
Second, the language is directed to everybody all over 
the society, flowing into our everyday life throughout the 
mass media. 
Contemporary surveillance, in a society of consumers, is 
double because is used by State and by Corporation and 
requires gaze (for collecting and elaborate personal data) 
and language (for steer and seduce citizens/consumers). 
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